Abstract
This chapter examines the conflicts between intelligence services and oversight bodies, driven by evolving expectations regarding intelligence accountability. Scholars have drawn attention to the emergence of turf wars, where services and overseers compete to expand their organizational domains. The chapter posits that understanding the role of institutional logics and their implications for democratic accountability is crucial in comprehending these ongoing tensions. By synthesizing insights from intelligence accountability and institutional logics literature, this research proposes a novel framework for analysing conflicts stemming from clashes of institutional logics. Through an in-depth investigation of a case involving the Danish Defence Intelligence Service and the Danish Intelligence Oversight Board, the chapter unveils nuanced interpretations of accountability that contribute to the strains between the services and their oversight bodies. This study contributes to the scholarly discourse by offering a nuanced understanding of intelligence accountability and introducing a Danish perspective to academic discussions in this field. Moreover, the chapter identifies distinct bureaucratic and security logics within the state order, enriching existing knowledge on institutional logics. Ultimately, this research underscores the necessity of considering institutional logics in comprehending and addressing conflicts in intelligence accountability, urging for broader discussions on intelligence governance beyond mere legislative reforms.