Abstract
The content and focus of China’s Arctic agenda have broadened in the recent decade as Beijing has focussed on establishing itself as a leading power within the domains of knowledge and innovative, new technologies. China has tried to establish its presence and influence in the Arctic, but the Chinese strategic approach of gradually building comprehensive relations with Arctic states and stakeholders—using, for example, offers of research cooperation, infrastructure projects, and trade and investments—has not been successful, which has left Russia as China’s gateway to the Arctic. The Arctic is an area of growing Russian and Chinese cooperation. The Sino-Russian joint statement from February 2022 declares, “The sides agreed to continue consistently intensifying practical cooperation for the sustainable development of the Arctic.”1 This mention of the Arctic is the first of its kind in a Sino-Russian joint statement, and it arguably indicates how a weakened Russia increasingly dependent on China could be willing to compromise on its resistance toward allowing non-Arctic states to play a stronger role in the region. Consequently, the key question is whether China has new strategic opportunities to establish its presence and influence in the Arctic following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.