Abstract
This chapter examines the evolving Chinese strategy in the Arctic, focusing especially on whether we see Chinese grey zone tactics aimed at taking advantage of the legal gaps, thresholds and uncertainties in Arctic governance to gradually push for a change in the Arctic governance regime allowing more influence for non-Arctic States such as China. It finds that there are various Chinese efforts to challenge the privileges of the Arctic States in Arctic governance and gradually influence or shape Arctic governance. However, these Chinese efforts have so far been limited, offering little support to warnings about Chinese lawfare activities in the Arctic. There is nonetheless reason to continue to carefully follow the evolving Chinese approach to the Arctic. This is especially the case following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that potentially presents China with new opportunities. A more isolated and weakened Russia increasingly dependent on China is forced to compromise regarding its resistance towards allowing non-Arctic States into the region, including into Arctic governance. Consequently, the Russian bargaining position in relation to China— including in relation to the Arctic—weakens, and with the Arctic Council on pause following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is more room for China to push for non-Arctic specific governance.