Abstract
By analyzing Chinese security policy in the South China Sea, utilizing Morgenthaus classical realist theory, this thesis aims to explore to what extent China is using a policy of status quo, expansionism and prestige, and the consequences hereof for the region.
The thesis concludes that China partially employs a status quo policy of armament and divide and rule which, when combined with regional distrust of China due to uncertainty about policy and Intentions, leads to an arms race and a security dilemma in the region. Motivated by “lost war” and “weakness” China seems to have embarked on a strategy of imperialism in an incremental fashion. Through an apparently deliberate “creeping invasion”, China gradually increases its control of the contested area. China is balancing the use of military force and diplomacy, seemingly taking every concession possible from the other claimants, while repeating its own claims for sovereignty in the South China Sea without causing a casus belli. China is assessed to do so until they have full control of the disputed area.
China employs prestige in the support of status quo and imperialism. In utilizing Morgenthaus theory the analysis unveils how states can employ partially status quo policy and imperialism simultaneously.