Abstract
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) land-based deterrence strategy in the
Baltic region has gained increasing relevance following the 2023 threat assessment by the
Danish Defence Intelligence Service, which warns of a heightened risk of conflict with
Russia. However, limited research has focused exclusively on NATO’s deterrence strategy
based on its permanently stationed land forces. This thesis seeks to address this gap by
applying the theoretical frameworks of offensive and defensive realism, as well as
deterrence theory, while explicitly excluding reinforcement units.
The analysis explores Russia’s motivations for aggression, NATO’s strategic
communication, and a comparative assessment of regional land forces. Using qualitative
document analysis, it draws on NATO statements, Russian declarations, and academic
literature.
The findings indicate that Russia’s motivation to invade the Baltic states is moderate, as
NATO does not constitute an existential threat. At the same time, NATO clearly
communicates the consequences of aggression, further reducing Russia’s incentive to
attack. However, the force balance and terrain analysis show that NATO does not possess
sufficient military strength to fully deter an attack, maintaining the assessment of the
likelihood of aggression at a moderate level.
The study concludes that NATO must enhance its presence while ensuring strategic
communication remains clear and consistent to prevent unnecessary escalation.