Abstract
Norwegian Armed Forces have participated in almost all NATO led missions after the cold war. Today Norwegian forces are fighting an increasing insurgency in Faryab province, Afghanistan. Even though ISAF are focusing on Counterinsurgency (COIN) in Afghanistan, Norway has not recognized COIN as the Campaign Theme.
To increase COIN capabilities among its member states, NATO has produced its first COIN doctrine, AJP‐ 3.4.4 Counterinsurgency. The Norwegian Army is considering implementing this as a national doctrine.
The thesis identifies the challenges this implementation will have on the Army. Through an analysis of the doctrine itself, the political and military level, several challenges are identified. The analysis shows that the Army will not be able to meet the terms of the doctrines key elements. The Army lacks the necessary capabilities to be able to conduct independent COIN operations. In addition, the Army culture and the educational system are tuned on conventional warfare. The main reason for this is a political priority on national security and a humanitarian discourse in Norway.
The necessary means the Army needs in order to establish doctrinally correct COIN capabilities, will probably never be given political priority.