Abstract
Insurgency has become a well-known phenomenon in military affairs. Based on a fundamental belief, that Danish military efforts in a counterinsurgency environment could be strengthened through an analysis of the present opponent – the Afghan insurgent – the aim of this project is the following: “based on fundamental characteristics of recent Afghan insurgencies, which differences and similarities exists between the Mujahideen and Taliban insurgencies?”
As to the methodological design, the analysis is conducted as a comparative case study, where the Mujahideen and Taliban insurgencies are the basis for the analysis. Using K. V. Nielsen’s theory “The Warfare cycle” as theoretical framework, this project examines the operational and strategic level of recent Afghan insurgencies, including the relation to the opponent – the intervening superpower.
The project concludes that the nature of both insurgencies, it being a political tool with a strategic aim, is basically the same. Conversely, the path to achieving objectives is fundamentally different. Whereas Mujahideen sought to defeat the Soviet intervention by attacking military objectives, Taliban is concentrated on weakening the will of the superpower. In particular the influence of technological development and the war view of the population leave you with the impression, that the two insurgencies are predominantly different. Recent Afghan insurgencies have shifted from an operational-driven insurgency to a strategic insurgency, where operational activities are only supporting the overall propaganda campaign.