Abstract
China’s coercive activities in the South China Sea have resulted in a livelyacademic debate regarding strategies to deter Beijing and maintain the status quo. However, much of this literature has been dominated by the U.S.–China dynamic and has neglected the vital role of the littoral states in the region. This article, through the lens of a maritime strategic environment, deals with the potential for the littoral nations of the South China Sea to deter China. It argues that conventional deterrence by denial is a difficult but applicable strategy despite the substantial power asymmetry that exists between China and the littoral states in the region. However, such a deterrent approach must be tailored to the specific, non-existential challenges that China poses in the region. Among these challenges, this article examines deterrence within the context of China’s claim to the Spratly Islands and expansive claims to economic exploitation rights. A maritime strategic environmentprovides multiple avenues to impose cost on a superior power and the littoral states in the region have invested heavily in naval capabilities. However, as this article finds, it remains to be seen if the littoral states in the region have the technical capability or political will to successfully enact such a deterrent strategy.