Abstract
Especially since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russians have been less hesitant to welcome China into the Russian Arctic – a vast region that accounts for approximately half of the Arctic. Improved access to the Russian Arctic – and the growing cooperation with Russia in the Arctic – means it is less imperative for China to gain access to other parts of the Arctic, including Greenland, from which the Chinese have retreated since 2019, and there are today no Chinese investments or projects in Greenland, nor are there Chinese ships circling around the island. In contrast to the US and Russia, China has no territory in the Arctic and fears being sidelined and excluded as the great power competition intensifies. That is why it is urgent for China to push for greater influence of non-Arctic-specific governance and legitimate rights for non-Arctic states in the region. China is not focusing on asserting control but rather on ensuring access.