Abstract
With modern warfare growing increasingly advanced technologically, legacy weapon systems and platforms lose their level of potency and thereby their effective deterrence in the eyes of the enemy. The 21st century has introduced a new generation of aerial warfighting; the so-called 5th generation (gen) of weapons systems and platforms now include low-observable characteristics, high-precision weapons, as well as high levels of data sharing and implementation whilst conserving the same capabilities as legacy 4thgen platforms. This paper examines the strategic, operational and tactical consequences for the Danish Air Force by acquiring the Norwegian 5th gen air-launched cruise missile - the Joint Strike Missile (JSM) - for its soon to be implemented F-35A fighter jets. The operational and tactical consequences were analyzed with regard to the theoretical perspectives and disposition of current North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrines and airpower theorist Colin S. Gray. This included Counter-Air, Strategic Attack, Air Power Contribution to Land Operations, Air Power Contribution to Maritime Operations and Info Ops. The strategic analysis focused on NATO and Russia specifically and included theorist Colin S. Gray as well as Robert J. Art. The findings highlighted that the Danish Air Force will have to operate in a new and partly undiscovered way with cruise missiles on their F-35, as the Danish Air Force never previously operated with such a capability. The findings also showed that the tactical and operational consequence of this new weapon system is the ability to neutralize targets located much deeper within enemy territory that may be guarded by some very capable air defense systems. This will enable the Danish Air Force to contribute in a broader operational spectrum and much earlier in a future campaign than ever before, resulting in a military strategic advantage. Furthermore, according to Art and Gray, acquiring the JSM for the F-35 means a higher level of credible threat to Russia and it can thereby potentially act as a valid means of deterrence. However, this deterrence continues to be dependent on other NATO alliance partner capabilities to deter the large military forces of Russia as a combined coalition. This strategic deterrent capability may result in the Danish Air Forces potential of being inserted earlier and broader in a NATO coalition campaign and therefore having the potential to influence political negotiations, agreements and operational plans within the NATO command structure.