Abstract
This study aims to examine the undertakings of Rommel and the DAK, in relation to three selected principles of war found in the Danish Armed Forces’ doctrine and through these examine paradoxes in relation to the art of conducting manoeuvre-based offensive operations. This study has found that the main principle on which Rommel relies, is that ofthe offensive. Hence the attacks are launched with haste, in favour of a build-up. This has the effect that both the sheer number of troops, as well as the cooperation between the different elements of the corps, are less than sufficient for tactical success. German intelligence had severe shortcomings, i.e. it lacked the ability to interpret the information available correctly. Rommel relies deeply on the principle of offensive action, while failing to identify the shift in the conduct of the British defence and to adapt his course of action. The main reasons identified are the misinterpreted intelligence correlated with Rommel’s strong belief in creating moments of opportunity through the use of offensive action and exploitation through the initative of the commanders. The overall recommendation based on the results of this study is that applying the principles of war as a tool for the officer, means that one needs to understand the concept as a complex interrelated framework rather than easily applicable stand-alone principles.