Abstract
Motivated by the seeming differences in how the threat of migration in the Mediterranean is perceived in Denmark and Greece, this paper sets out to examine how this effects Frontex operations at the external border of the EU. In particular the focus is on how dilemmas in Joint Operation Poseidon emerge and are handled by officers from the Royal Danish Navy (RDN). This is done first, by applying securitization theory to the way the threat of migration is being discursively constructed. While existing differences should in part be understood in light of the difference in physical distance to the Mediterranean, they none the less have consequences for the way border protection is practised. Building on this, the paper employs a Bourdieusian practice theoretical perspective to understand the field and habitus that affect the practice of RDN officers in the operation. In Joint Operation Poseidon, RDN officers practice a large degree of control with patrols. This is a consequence of Greek liaison officers taking little command of operations, and that they to some degree are perceived as less competent. Furthermore, RDN officers have a practice of defining issues in relation to safety. This provides them with a larger degree of control than the formal organisation indicates. Lastly, there is a balancing act in being deployed on a mandate based on fundamental rights in an operation led by the Hellenic Coast Guard, who have been accused of disregarding these same principles. Going forward, it is a fundamental question how this balance is struck. A question that it is currently to a large degree left to the individual officers, as the political will to confront the question of Greek practices towards migrants appear to be lacking.