Anna Sofie Hansen Schøning

Resumé
Den militære profession bliver ofte fremstillet som særlig. Professionen adskiller sig ikke mindst fra andre ved at professionelle soldater i lange perioder, måske årtier eller længere, ikke udøver deres professions kerneopgave, nemlig deltagelse i krig. I fraværet af krig frembyder studiet af tidligere krige et alternativ til personlig krigserfaring. Men det er i høj grad omdiskuteret i militær- og historiefaglige kredse, hvordan fortid kan omsættes til læring og dermed bruges for fremtid. Selvom der findes flere studier af, hvordan militærhistorie bruges i Hærens videregående officersuddannelse har disse studier ofte kun begrænset empirisk og teoretisk dybde. Med en historieteoretisk tilgang, inspireret af blandt andre Reinhart Koselleck, analyserer jeg derfor i denne afhandling, hvordan det på Hærens videregående officersuddannelse, 1900 til 2016, blev forstået muligt at lære af historie, samt hvilke epistemologiske og historieteoretiske forståelser denne læring implicerede. Afhandlingen bygger på en omfangsrig empiri bestående af undervisningsbøger, lærerplaner, evalueringer m.v., samt debat om historiebrug fordelt på tre tidsmæssige nedslag henholdsvis 1900-1920, 1960-1980 og 1996-2016. Det lange tidsperspektiv gør det muligt at få øje på stabilitet og forandring i de måder, officerer fandt det muligt at lære af militærhistorie. Afhandlingen konkluderer, at selvom den danske sikkerhedspolitiske situation og forøgede krigserfaringer blandt danske officerer i begyndelsens af det 21. århundrede påvirkede hvilke fortider officerer anså som lærerige, så var måden officerer forstod det muligt at lære af fortider overraskende stabil. Der eksisterede to overordnede opfattelser af, hvordan det blev set som muligt at lære af militærhistorie, henholdsvis at militærhistorie kunne være handlingsanvisende eller indsigtsgivende. Handlingsanvisning betegner den tilgang, at man på baggrund af krigshistorie kan uddrage universelt gældende principper for krigsførelse eller ligefrem kan kopiere fortidige løsninger. Overfor denne tilgang findes synspunktet, at det kun er muligt at opnå en generel indsigt af studiet af krigshistorie, fordi krigsførelse ikke er styret af underliggende principper, men af en ikke altid rationel menneskelig praksis. Hvordan disse begreber nærmere skal forstås, uddyber jeg i afhandlingen ved at analysere 12 forskellige formål med studiet af militærhistorie. En mere nuanceret forståelse af hvordan det blev forstået muligt at lære af militærhistorie i Hærens videregående officersuddannelse er ikke kun relevant i et militært perspektiv, men også i et historieteoretisk perspektiv eftersom det giver indblik i en empirisk underbelyst fortidsbrug. På grund af afhandlingens unikke kildemateriale er det muligt at undersøge, hvordan begreberne historie og erfaring blev brugt i praksis. De to begreber blev ofte brugt synonymt, da mange undervisere så militærhistorie som nedskrevet erfaring eller som noget, det på et mere eller mindre generelt plan var muligt at uddrage erfaringer fra. Således kan studiet af militærhistorie på Hærens videregående officersuddannelse siges at være en måde at binde teori og praksis sammen på.

In the 1970s Danish debates on military history revealed a bifurcated understanding of military history between descriptive and applied military history. Descriptive military history was the study of military history done by academic historians, and applied military his- tory was done by and taught to officers. The divide between descriptive and applied was rooted in the professionalization of history and officer education; it was constructed in order to accommodate the criticism that military history used in officer education did not live up to aca- demic standards. By taking the Danish debates in the 1970s as a point of departure, this article introduces some fundamental challenges regard- ing the use of military history in officer education. Inspired by the Ger- man historian Reinhart Koselleck, the article argues that developments within academic history since the 1970s might have alleviated the con- flict between academic military history and the military history used in officer education. Certainly, these new developments have opened up new approaches to military history.

The article investigates how military history was taught as part of the Danish higher officer education from 1830 to 1920 and how the subject was affected by developments in academic history and the science of war. It argues that military history, as it was taught in the formal officer education, could not be seen solely as a historic subject but also as a subject under the influence of the discipline of military science. Three very different understandings of how military history can contribute to higher officer education are shown through the analysis of textbooks. In the 1830s military history was used to establish national and organisational identity. In the 1880s, military history was used as a means to find, explain and apply universal principles of war and, in the 1910s, military history should be used as a means to gain general insight that could potentially lead to a better understanding of war and warfare.

This report, which was commissioned at the end of 2014 by the political parties behind the Danish engagement in Afghanistan, is the contribution of the Royal Danish Defence College to the compilation of lessons from the Danish Integrated Approach concept in support of operations in Afghanistan. It is one of three studies and is intended to provide a concise, accurate and practical collection of the Danish lessons stemming from the projects that the Danish Armed Forces carried out within the defence budget framework in support of military operations (the so-called CIMIC (i.e. civil-military cooperation) projects), as well as the lessons from stabilisation projects carried out in cooperation between the Danish Armed Forces and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Afghanistan, and which were financed through the Global Framework Fund and its successor fund, the Peace and Stabilisation Fund.The Royal Danish Defence College was furthermore tasked to investigate the stabilisation efforts and military operations in Afghanistan to establish how they were integrated and concerted and assess where possible their outcomes in relation to the indicators of progress, i.e. security, governance and development, to provide a basis for further recommendations in relation to future Danish stabilisation operations. The report, therefore, only describes a fraction of the total Danish expenditures in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014, i.e. the 16 million Danish kroner allocated for stabilisation projects and the 7 million Danish kroner spent on CIMIC activities.