Kåre Dahl

Kapitlet ser på udviklingen og status af Ruslands luftmagt. Det moderniserede russiske luft- og rumvåben er ikke længere en træt skygge af sig selv. Det er optimeret til at løse de pålagte opgaver i russisk kontekst, hvilket primært består i beskyttelse og håndhævelse af egen suverænitet, samt støtte til de russiske landstyrker. Selvom Ruslands luftmilitære kapacitet i størrelse og omfang er langt underlegen et samlet NATO og også er mindre end den europæiske del af NATO, så vurderes det alligevel at være en hård nød at knække i tilfælde af en konflikt, blandt andet i lyset af Ruslands mange og sofistikerede jordbaserede luftforsvarssystemer.

The article presents findings from a research study which examined organisational barriers to innovation and co-creation experienced during course of action formation processes in military operational planning. We investigated both classroom and practical experiences of courses of action brainstorm development when conducted as outlined in the NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive. In-depth interviews were conducted and combined with one observational case study that involved continual dialogue with central actors involved. The findings indicate that there can be substantial differences between ideal types of brainstorming and the actual brainstorm processes that unfold during course of action development in teaching as well as in real planning situations. The article coins the term brickstorm to capture elements of this process.

How innovation theory can contribute to the military operations planning process

Keywords: Military planning processes, innovation theory, COA development, perceptions of knowledge, military education

The research study considers how the application of innovation theory might contribute to military staff work planning processes and bring new perspectives to operational models of analysis such as NATO’s Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) and the Danish Field Manual III.

The aim of this presentation is to present some theoretical considerations and empirical findings from a preliminary research study investigating the information metabolism of military planning groups – commanders and their staff – in the operative planning process. The study considers the military staff work’s translation of information, capabilities, and desired strategic outcomes into operation plans and combines the empirical findings with innovation theory and theories on leadership. The background for this ambition is the need to increase agility and creativity of military planning in response to seemingly still more complex hybrid conflicts and operational environments in which the military is engaged (see Griffin 2016).

The research project explores the value of innovation theory for military planning processes and suggests areas where, according to our findings, it seems possible and valuable to integrate recent theoretical developments within the innovation domain into the military planning practice.

Approaches leaning on innovation theory have proliferated in social studies and organizational development projects in recent years. Innovation theory (according to some analytical distinctions; see for instance Mayland 2017; Roberts 2017; Darsø 2011 and 2012; Grigsby et al. 2011) comprises a number of central concepts and ‘reflection points’. These include for instance the concept of design thinking; the distinction between convergent and divergent thinking; the focus on embodied competences and taken-for-granted world views embedded in the performance of routine practices (such as the military planning process as depicted by NATO’s Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, COPD1); the interest in meanings, i.e. norms, world views, and values that guide and saturate these practices; and the systemic attention on relations as well as the implicit ‘code of conduct’ implied in these relations. It is a central observation of the study that these factors may be influenced and enhanced by a number of leadership techniques.

The project was rooted in a social constructivist perspective. The research approach was qualitative with the aim to investigate military planning and operations development processes and illuminate subjective experiences of these processes. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted and combined with an observational study in order to get knowledge about the research interests. The empirical data included interviews with central military staffs working with operational planning. Participants were selected on the basis of their experience as instructors and/or facilitators of military planning processes. All of them were well-experienced with taking part in the military planning process and COA development. The observational study followed the Danish officer training in the MA level course Joint Campaign Planning and parts of the course Advanced Land Operations conducted at the Royal Danish Defence College in 2016–2017. Furthermore the analysis included a literature study of Danish and NATO staff work guidelines and integrated this with innovation theory and theories on leadership.

Our findings pointed to at least four central themes where innovation theory may contribute to a further development of the military planning process:

• The challenge of getting planning staffs to switch to a divergent mindset when working within convergent thinking structures.

• Factors related to the importance of embracing and enhancing diversity as a condition for reflective, critical thinking. These factors included: the composition of staffs and the structuring of planning and analysis processes; the importance of staff working groups being capable of establishing an internal ‘cognitive disjunction’ in order to avoid groupthink (cf. Janis 1972); the importance of instituting an openness towards unruly perspectives and wild ideas (cf. Darsø 2011; Mayland et al. 2017); and the need for an organizational awareness of the dominant perception of knowledge. The perception of knowledge plays a key role in the effort to avoid internal antagonistic debate cultures where disagreement is perceived as ‘either-or’ rather than considered as an important contribution to create exploring dialogues that may improve the final outcome (e.g. the COA)

• The balancing of constraints and restraints. The COA development process may be regarded as the processual and conceptual center where the operational (or tactical) plan is forged. Our findings pointed however to the fact that sometimes the function of this center seems to be that of assembly rather than of innovation.

• The influence of the ‘time factor’ and what to do with it.

• The main intention of the presentation is not to assert certain findings as facts. Rather we wish to present some preliminary observations and theoretical reflections in order to invite researchers and military professionals to engage in a dialogue that expands and qualifies current perspectives on military staff work planning processes with the view to improve military education and organization. Questions such as the ones raised by Zweibelson (2015) concerning the (in)commensurability between military planning and design thinking, or the challenges in relation to instituting organizational changes as identified by Roberts2 (2017) will be interesting to explore in light of this theme.