Morten Gall Jørgensen

The sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipes and the exposure of Russian maritime espionage on the Scandinavian countries has exposed hybrid threats to the public. The nature of the threats makes it inherently difficult to form a suitable response, as they balance on the edge of accountability and legality. This study discerns the possibilities and restrictions for Denmark’s ability to counter these emerging hybrid threats in the maritime domain through a legal policy analysis of UNCLOS. The study finds that foreign nations have an array of options for hybrid threats against Denmark. Denmark is obligated to ensure the safe and unrestricted passage of commercial traffic through the Danish straits, and UNCLOS allow for other states to gather intelligence and conduct mapping of Danish infrastructure in the EEZ. Though Denmark is levied with restrictions there are possibilities for Denmark to counter some hybrid threats. Establishment of security zones around essential infrastructure would limit the access for unauthorized vessels and an interpretation on the essential elements of a modern-day commercial vessel could supply Denmark with a means to restrict the Russian shadow fleet from its actions in Danish waters. A bolstered legal standpoint combined with the ability to detect underwater activity and the means to respond to any activity that poses a threat to Denmark’s infrastructure would greatly enhance the current capability to deter hybrid threats in Denmark’s maritime domain.