Søren Sjøgren

One fundamental question has captured the attention of professionals and scholars since the dawn of war: what does the future of war look like? In today’s military-strategic context, this question has gained renewed urgency because of surging tensions between major military powers and rapid advancements in the military tools at their disposal. War is and has always been a reflection of the technological, economic, social, and political context in which it is waged. Some believe that the future of war will be radically different from wars in the past. Others believe that the more changes, the more remains the same. The Future of War Conference seeks to move forward this discussion and examines how the character of future war is likely to evolve over the course of the next decade and beyond. 

War and PowerPoint presentations: interventions in the military staff organisation

This paper presents how STS concepts can be used to understand organisational work and how the organisation might benefit. The case study is a Multinational NATO division. The primary task of the division is to plan military operations. This is done by translating military doctrine into operational plans. A common doctrine, which can broadly be understood as a set of standards on how to operate, is a central element of multinational interoperability. In NATO, doctrine exists in written manuals. The staff work according to standardised methods of planning laid out broadly in planning doctrine and specified in detail in standard operating procedures. The staff officers understood themselves as rational and analytical. I observed how the staff officers struggled with conceptual and material elements of the network they were part of by paying attention to everyday breakdowns when procedures were tinkered with. I found that historically successful military operations were deemed inappropriate since they did not the staff’s imagination of warfare. Other operational ideas were scrapped since they did not fit the PowerPoint template. The intervention presented cases for the staff officers where their tools were clear co-producers of what could be thought and where particular conceptions of doctrine led to specific solutions. The organisation is not rational. Instead, events are interpreted through pre-existing ideas.