Peter Viggo Jakobsen

Denmark positioned itself as the largest global Ukraine donor measured as

percentage of GDP during 2022–2026 in order to restore its battered status in

NATO and enhance its own security. Denmark had used disproportionate force

contributions to international operations very successfully to create frontrunner

status in NATO and Washington and contribute to international security in the

1990–2014 period. However, unwilling to spend more on defence and meet

NATO’s new capability goals designed to counter the rising Russian threat,

after 2014 Denmark lost its high status in the Alliance. This made it an obvious

choice to use Ukraine donations in the same way as force contributions to

restore Denmark’s standing in the Alliance and improve its national security.

Denmark can be expected to maintain its high level of support in the years to

come because it is the most effective way to enhance Danish and European

security in a world where American support in the event of a Russian attack on

NATO no longer can be taken for granted.

I Nyt fra Ukraine får du et unikt indblik i, hvordan 15 eksperter personligt oplevede optakten til Ukraine-krigen og natten, hvor den brød ud den 24. februar 2022. De fortæller, hvad der skete i “maskinrummet” i Folketinget, i Udenrigsministeriet, på redaktionen og på ambassaden.

Bogen bringer dig helt tæt på de eksperter, som har dækket og formidlet Ukraine-krigen for danskerne i nu 1000 dage. Ved at læse deres personlige fortællinger får du en dybere forståelse for krigen og dens indvirkning på verden og et bud på fremtiden – samt et indblik i, hvilke overvejelser eksperterne gør sig, når de skal formidle krigen til danskerne.

Since the Great Recession in 2008, the academic debate has been flooded with literature that predicts the sunset of the liberal world order including the practice of humanitarian intervention as initiated at the United Nations (UN) in the early 1990s and regulated by the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. In contrast, this article argues that the practice of humanitarian intervention continues to operate under post-hegemonic and multipolar conditions, but in new ways. Based on a theorization of fundamental institutional change and exploratory case studies of the international reactions to the humanitarian crises in Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Syria and Mali, and supportive evidence from Gambia and DR Congo, we show that contemporary humanitarian intervention is closely related to a normalization of the fundamental institution of great power management and a regionalization of international society. In this post-hegemonic world order, humanitarian intervention is shaped, facilitated or hampered by various practices of great power management including concert, soft balancing and hard balancing. The return of great-power competition means an inconsistent and sometimes counterproductive resort to humanitarian intervention far from the ideals of the R2P, but the growing importance of regional ownership affects the great powers, keeps this potential response to mass atrocity crimes on the table and adds to its legitimacy.

An Iranian fishing vessel, Almeraj 1, was reportedly hijacked by Somali pirates in November 2023. According to media reports, the pirates demanded US$400,000 in ransom and threatened to use the Iranian ship for additional hijackings if the payment was not made. Two days later, other Somali pirates hijacked a tanker, Central Park, off the Yemeni coast. The tanker sent a distress signal during the attack. Forces from a nearby American warship captured the pirates as they tried to flee in a small boat. The two attacks have led the Somali government to call for greater international support to deter a resurgence of piracy in the Horn of Africa. Similar fears that Somali piracy was on the rebound surfaced after five previous attacks in 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020. We have been studying the rise and fall of Somali piracy, and have tracked the problem for years. We do not regard a major rise in Somali piracy as likely and this article explains why.

Hovedproblemet med Forsvarskommandoens militærfaglige anbefaling til det kommende forsvarsforlig er ikke dens facit, men at processen har været forceret, hemmelig og kendetegnet ved begrænset inddragelse af værnene, fordi man var bange for, at resultatet ville blive lækket. En mere åben tilgang vil have store fordele over den nuværende.