Peter Viggo Jakobsen

The Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway,

Sweden) are emerging as a model for the Europeanisation of NATO. They have enhanced

their political and military cooperation significantly since 2022 to address the growing

threats of Russian aggression and the US abandonment of NATO. They seek to "keep the

US in and Russia out" by taking the lead in supporting Ukraine militarily and by increasing

their collective capacity to deter and defend against Russia with less American support. Their progress in military integration is noteworthy and a source of inspiration for other NATO members, but their model is not easy to copy.

Denmark positioned itself as the largest global Ukraine donor measured as

percentage of GDP during 2022–2026 in order to restore its battered status in

NATO and enhance its own security. Denmark had used disproportionate force

contributions to international operations very successfully to create frontrunner

status in NATO and Washington and contribute to international security in the

1990–2014 period. However, unwilling to spend more on defence and meet

NATO’s new capability goals designed to counter the rising Russian threat,

after 2014 Denmark lost its high status in the Alliance. This made it an obvious

choice to use Ukraine donations in the same way as force contributions to

restore Denmark’s standing in the Alliance and improve its national security.

Denmark can be expected to maintain its high level of support in the years to

come because it is the most effective way to enhance Danish and European

security in a world where American support in the event of a Russian attack on

NATO no longer can be taken for granted.

The Western military strategy debate on the Ukraine War has focused on defeating Russian forces inside Ukraine militarily and the associated risk of Russian nuclear escalation. Too little attention has been given to the possibility of Ukraine achieving victory-by-coercion, a negotiated outcome carrying a lower risk of nuclear escalation than victory-by-defeat. This article fills this gap by outlining the conditions for victory-by-coercion and applying them to the Ukraine War. The analysis shows that the US-led coercive strategy employed against Russia failed to impose enough economic and military pain to create the urgency for compliance in Moscow that coercive victory requires. It also finds that coercion must be paired with credible assurances that punitive measures will cease if demands are met, and that the unwillingness to offer Russia positive incentives to withdraw decreased the likelihood of a negotiated solution.

I Nyt fra Ukraine får du et unikt indblik i, hvordan 15 eksperter personligt oplevede optakten til Ukraine-krigen og natten, hvor den brød ud den 24. februar 2022. De fortæller, hvad der skete i “maskinrummet” i Folketinget, i Udenrigsministeriet, på redaktionen og på ambassaden.

Bogen bringer dig helt tæt på de eksperter, som har dækket og formidlet Ukraine-krigen for danskerne i nu 1000 dage. Ved at læse deres personlige fortællinger får du en dybere forståelse for krigen og dens indvirkning på verden og et bud på fremtiden – samt et indblik i, hvilke overvejelser eksperterne gør sig, når de skal formidle krigen til danskerne.

Since the Great Recession in 2008, the academic debate has been flooded with literature that predicts the sunset of the liberal world order including the practice of humanitarian intervention as initiated at the United Nations (UN) in the early 1990s and regulated by the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. In contrast, this article argues that the practice of humanitarian intervention continues to operate under post-hegemonic and multipolar conditions, but in new ways. Based on a theorization of fundamental institutional change and exploratory case studies of the international reactions to the humanitarian crises in Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Syria and Mali, and supportive evidence from Gambia and DR Congo, we show that contemporary humanitarian intervention is closely related to a normalization of the fundamental institution of great power management and a regionalization of international society. In this post-hegemonic world order, humanitarian intervention is shaped, facilitated or hampered by various practices of great power management including concert, soft balancing and hard balancing. The return of great-power competition means an inconsistent and sometimes counterproductive resort to humanitarian intervention far from the ideals of the R2P, but the growing importance of regional ownership affects the great powers, keeps this potential response to mass atrocity crimes on the table and adds to its legitimacy.