Anne Sofie Schøtt

The battle of Kobane during the winter of 2014-15, at which the Kurdish forces broke the siege of Islamic State, marked the first major setback of Islamic State on the Syrian front. It also marked the beginning of close military cooperation between the US-led coalition against Islamic State and the Syrian Kurdish forces. Fighting the same enemy in the same territory, the international coalition and the local militia came to depend on each other. While the coalition provided close air support for the Kurdish forces, the Syrian Kurds provided ground forces for the coalition. In October 2015, the establishment of the SDF paved the way for a more formal tactical alliance between the coalition and the Kurds. This implied among others that the US deployed military personnel to Syria as well as provided the SDF with heavy military equipment.

This paper investigates the strategic consequences of the coalition’s tactical alliance with the SDF. Applying a strategic interactionism approach, the paper focuses on the strategies of the involved actors and the outcome of their interaction. This allows the paper to assess whether the actors reached their goals and to identify the long term unintended consequences of interaction. The paper argues that the alliance succeeded in fighting Islamic State, but allying with the SDF dragged the coalition into the power play of the Kurds in Northern Syria and into a critical debate on the ways and means of fighting alongside a militia. 

This paper investigates the strategic consequences of the tactical alliance between the US-led international coalition against Islamic State and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The military cooperation between the coalition and the Syrian Kurds fighting Islamic State initiated during the battle of Kobane in 2014. Over the subsequent years, the cooperation turned into a more formal alliance as the US stepped up its support for the SDF deploying military personnel to Syria and providing the SDF with heavy military equipment. Applying a strategic interactionism approach, the paper argues that the alliance succeeded in defeating Islamic State. However, allying with the SDF dragged the US into the power play of the Kurds in Northern Syria. This did not only stress the US relationship with NATO ally Turkey, but it also implied frictions with Russian forces along the Euphrates River.