Anne Sofie Schøtt

Islamisk Stat findes stadig. Ikke som en selvudråbt stat på grænsen mellem Irak og Syrien, men som en terrororganisation. De seneste trusselsvurderinger fra både FE (Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste) og PET (Politiets Efterretningstjeneste) viser også, at organisationen fortsat udfører angreb i Mellemøsten og Afrika og appellerer til sympatisører i Danmark.

I Irak er antallet af angreb begået af Islamisk Stat imidlertid blevet færre i de seneste år.

Men selv om der er færre irakere, som mister livet på grund af angreb fra Islamisk Stat, udgør bevægelsens angreb stadig en alvorlig trussel mod den irakiske stats stabilitet. I 2022 stod Islamisk Stat således i gennemsnit bag 38 angreb og 64 døde hver måned i Irak. Det bemærkelsesværdige er, at angrebene især finder sted i nogle særlige områder. eUd over området i og omkring Baghdad drejer det sig primært om grænseområdet mellem den autonome Kurdistan-region i Nordirak og resten af Irak.

Jeg vil i denne artikel undersøge, hvorfor det går så langsomt med at løse sikkerhedsproblemet netop i grænseområdet. Det sker på baggrund af 10 dages nyligt feltarbejde, hvor jeg besøgte de to kurdiske hovedbyer Erbil og Sulaymaniyah i Nordirak.

Kampen for en kurdisk stat har længe lidt under en stor række politiske spændinger i Mellemøsten, hvilket blandt andet i 1988 udmøntede sig i verdenshistoriens hidtil største kemiske angreb mod en civilbefolkning, nemlig Halabja-massakren.

I dagens episode sætter vi derfor fokus på den kurdiske kamp for selvstændighed, Halabja-massakren og det politiske efterspil, for at forstå, hvorfor kurderne i dag stadig ikke har et land at kalde deres eget.

Anne Sofie Allarp har derfor inviteret ph.d. i mellemøststudier og adjunkt på Institut for Strategi og Krigsstudier Anne Sofie Schøtt i studiet, så du kan forstå hvordan den kurdiske selvstændighedskamp ændrede verdenshistorien.

Vært og tilrettelæggelse: Anne Sofie Allarp.

Produktion & klip: Oliver Ruby

Musik: Troels Kaaber, Fathma Fahmi & Leo Peter Larsen.

Examines how the Kurdish diaspora in Denmark supported the Kurdish struggle in Syria from the battle of Kobane (2014) to the defeat in Afrin (2018).

The book contributes to our understanding of mobilisation and identity formation in the periphery of the Kurdish diaspora by examining the small but well-established community in Denmark. Arguing that the diaspora is treated differently by the Danish authorities – in comparison to neighbouring Sweden and Germany – Anne Sofie Schøtt examines the political lobbyism, the courtroom activism and the humanitarian action of the various Kurdish diaspora groups. This includes examining the position of the Syrian Kurds within the diaspora who, like the Kurds in Syria, have been largely ignored until recently.

The book also provides new knowledge on diaspora engagement in war in the homeland by analysing the strategic interaction between the Danish authorities and the Kurdish diaspora community – both engaged in the war against Islamic State, but on different terms.

Key Features

• Investigates how the Kurdish diaspora mobilised in support of Syrian Kurds, stressing the role of transnational actors in war

• Introduces strategic interactionism into the study of diaspora mobilisation, showing new paths for research

• Coins the term ‘alter-territorial’ identification to clarify how some Kurds identify with the political entity in a part of Kurdistan other than their place of origin

The battle of Kobane during the winter of 2014-15, at which the Kurdish forces broke the siege of Islamic State, marked the first major setback of Islamic State on the Syrian front. It also marked the beginning of close military cooperation between the US-led coalition against Islamic State and the Syrian Kurdish forces. Fighting the same enemy in the same territory, the international coalition and the local militia came to depend on each other. While the coalition provided close air support for the Kurdish forces, the Syrian Kurds provided ground forces for the coalition. In October 2015, the establishment of the SDF paved the way for a more formal tactical alliance between the coalition and the Kurds. This implied among others that the US deployed military personnel to Syria as well as provided the SDF with heavy military equipment.

This paper investigates the strategic consequences of the coalition’s tactical alliance with the SDF. Applying a strategic interactionism approach, the paper focuses on the strategies of the involved actors and the outcome of their interaction. This allows the paper to assess whether the actors reached their goals and to identify the long term unintended consequences of interaction. The paper argues that the alliance succeeded in fighting Islamic State, but allying with the SDF dragged the coalition into the power play of the Kurds in Northern Syria and into a critical debate on the ways and means of fighting alongside a militia.