Jørgen Meedom Staun

Denne artikel analyserer og diskuterer fremtiden for Arktisk Råd i konteksten af den intensiverede stormagtskonkurrence, herunder særligt det styrkede strategiske partnerskab mellem Rusland og Kina på den ene side og de vestlige arktiske stater på den anden side. Hovedspørgsmålet er, hvorvidt Rusland – i en situation, hvor Moskva i stigende grad er under pres fra Vesten og stærkt afhængigt af Kina – kan tænkes at efterkomme det kinesiske ønske om institutionsbygning udenom Arktisk Råd?

De næste år vil derfor blive vanskelige for Arktisk Råd, der skal balancere forskellige hensyn og interesser. Der er meget, der taler for at få en pragmatisk dialog i stand med Rusland om Arktisk Råds fremtid. Det forudsætter, at de vestlige arktiske stater, inkl. Danmark, som i 2025 overtager formandskabet for Arktisk Råd, bliver enige om en fremtidsvision for Arktisk Råd, som inkluderer Rusland.

Bogen undersøger, hvorfor Rusland invaderede Ukraine i 2022 og spørger, hvilken trussel det russiske militær udgør for Danmark i dag. Først diskuteres styreformen, elitens verdensbillede og den accelererende militarisme i det russiske samfund for ad denne vej at tegne et billede af Ruslands politiske og militære intentioner.

Dernæst analyseres den russiske militære evne værn for værn efter devisen: Hvor militært stærkt var Rusland før krigen i Ukraine i 2022? Hvad har Rusland lært og hvad betyder de tre års kampe i Ukraine for det russiske militærs evne? Og hvad betyder det for Danmark og NATO – den sikkerhedspolitiske ramme indenfor hvilken vores forsvar finder sted?

Russia’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to concern about the implications for Arctic governance and stability. The Arctic Council has been temporarily suspended and the security tension between Russia and the seven other Western Arctic states has intensified. A more isolated Russia under Western sanctions leans even more towards the East, where China, especially, figures as an attractive strategic partner. In this article, we set out to examine the prospects for Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation in the Arctic. We introduce a social constructivist perspective highlighting how strategic culture may serve as a lens through which to analyse developments in states’ strategies – specifically their ends, ways and means. Applying our culturally applicable ends-ways-means (EWM) model, we show how Russian and Chinese strategic cultures set distinct limits to their strategic cooperation in the Arctic. The two states’ identity-driven urge to secure and display their great power position will increasingly collide. It is therefore our prediction that Russia and China will eventually act in ways that will gradually come to undermine their strategic cooperation in the region.

This article explores Russia's attack on Ukraine using the lens of strategic culture. Specifically, two strands in Russian strategic culture are identified. The first is a deep-seated sense of vulnerability, especially vis-a-vis "the West." To counter this perceived threat, Russia's national security establishment has long emphasized the importance of possessing strategic depth and buffer zones. The second strand revolves around a feeling of entitlement to great power status. A central component in Russia's great power vision is the right to have a sphere of influence in its Eurasian neighborhood. The article shows that Kremlin officials perceived Ukraine's drift toward the West as a major threat to both Russia's security interests and its status aspirations. As a result, Russia's rhetorical milieu regarding Ukraine became increasingly radicalized. The article concludes that this provided the discursive and intellectual habitat that enabled Putin to launch a large-scale attack.