Henrik Østergaard Breitenbauch

With this special issue of Defence Studies, we situate defence planning as a constitutive element of defence and strategic studies. Indeed, in addition to the usual “downstream” focus on the use or non-use of force, on policy decision-making in foreign relations, military operations and global external engagement, we argue for the utility of an increased “upstream” focus on what is a major part of everyday defence and security policy practice for military, civilian administrative and political leadership: the forward-looking preparations for the armed forces and other capabilities of tomorrow. In particular, the special issue contributions explore two general dimensions of defence planning: the long-term, historical relationship between defence planning and the state including national variations in civil-military relations, and a concurrent tension between defence planning as an administrative, analytically neutral activity and the politics of its organisation and outcomes. In both of these, defence planning appears as a particular case of general planning, as a lens that enables particular foci on the external world to come about on behalf of the state while also sometimes creating institutionalised biases along the way. In this manner, paraphrasing Émile Durkheim, defence planning emerges as a “strategic fact” with dynamics of its own.

Through the contributions of this special issue, defence planning emerges as a strategic fact with a significance of its own. Defence planning does not merely serve as a conduit for external forces, but instead appears as an independent or intermediate variable as well as a discrete arena for national security processing. In this conclusion, we return to the overall issue of defence planning as an object of study as proposed in the introduction. We identify three analytical dimensions inspired by the contributions which offer avenues for future research on defence planning. These are process versus change, the issue of national versus comparative or international dynamics, and finally hybrid or interface dynamics. It is, in other words, important to account for the roles defence planning may play with regard to affecting change in strategic affairs, to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of defence planning in central national cases such as the US as well as the international and comparative aspects of such dynamics, and finally it is important to analyse the characteristics and effects of defence planning in its wider political, administrative and strategic contexts.

The Nordic-Baltic countries are not really a region, but a proto- region that perhaps is coming closer to being a proper region because of the changing geopolitical conditions outside the area. Russian actions in Ukraine have increased threat perception in the region and pose a fundamental and troubling challenge to the way international security has been structured in Europe since the end of the Cold War. While most of the existing defense cooperation with a view of strengthening defense capabilities has been carried out within the internationally renowned framework of NORDEFCO, there is no reason why this framework could not be extended to the Baltic states.36 A NORBALDEFCO would not only cement the prominent role of Sweden and Finland within NATO as premier partners, it would also formally continue the work begun with Baltic independ- ence after the Cold War, and furthermore strengthen the NATO aspect of Nordic-Baltic security.