Henrik Østergaard Breitenbauch

Abstract and recommendations

An intensifying great-power competition takes the form of a military technological competition focusing on disruptive technologies from the Fourth Industrial Revolution. For small states such as Denmark, this increases the value of being able to keep up with and understand the evolving international military technological development in order to prioritize where and how to invest in new military acquisition projects. For Denmark, this presents a particularly tough challenge. Due to a number of budget analyses and reforms, the Danish approach to acquiring military capacities holds limited scope for monitoring and understanding the international military technological development. This report introduces the term ‘military technological situational awareness’ (MTSA) as a particular state competence which is separate from the acquisition of large-scale military technology although it does support these processes. A high level of MTSA supports decision makers in defence and security policy, including the defence planning process. The report shows that the development of the Danish military acquisition model has resulted in a limited state capacity for MTSA. Danish processes for monitoring and creating an understanding of international military technological development focus mostly on gathering information through allied partners (often closely connected with acquisition projects) and involves only parts of the military technological network in a non-formalized way.

The analysis of the report identifies a number of potentials for the Danish military technological network which can contribute to the development of MTSA. First, the formulation of a Danish military innovation policy can establish a framework for guaranteeing focus on developing and retaining Danish military technological knowledge, both nationally and through international cooperation. A coherent policy can support cooperation, knowledge sharing, and network properties between universities, the Danish and the international defence industry, and public authorities regarding research, development, testing, and production of innovative military technologies. The Danish Ministry of Defence can strengthen and utilize the extended military technological network in gathering, sorting, and prioritizing knowledge and information. The size and cohesion of the network can be strengthened in both its formal and informal aspects. The network can be further formalized, activated periodically, and be deepened in certain relationships. Similarly, the possibilities for activating the network in formal processes can be strengthened and include larger parts of the network when it comes to general long-term planning processes and more specific capacity acquisition processes. The Danish Ministry of Defence and especially the Danish Armed Forces can increase the value of technical and technological knowledge for both military and civilian personnel. Technological knowledge and the specialization in related skills can be described more explicitly as a career path and generally be granted higher value in all phases of human resource management – recruitment, education, in-service training, and promotions. The prioritization of MTSA can be further institutionalized by establishing the position of Chief Scientist to the Chief of Defence. The Chief Scientist will ensure that the Chief of Defence has access to updated and relevant knowledge on new technologies and can be included in discussions about the role of technology in new initiatives. Finally, the cooperative framework for the Danish Armed Forces and the Danish defence industry can be strengthened through public-private partnerships, cross-institutional development projects, and an increased focus on the European Defence Fund. These initiatives can include civilian firms, as potential synergies can be discovered in the development of dual-use technologies. 

Denne rapport er en del af Center for Militære Studiers forskningsbaserede myndighedsbetjening for Forsvarsministeriet og de politiske partier bag forsvarsforliget. Rapportens formål er at analysere, hvordan sikkerhedspolitisk dialog og engagement mellem Vesten og Rusland kan styrkes. Rapporten viser, at en række faktorer sandsynligvis vil forværre krisen mellem Rusland og vesten, men at Vesten kan udnytte et bredere politisk rum til at søge stabiliserende samarbejde med Rusland. På den baggrund kommer rapporten med en række anbefalinger til, hvordan Danmark kan påvirke den internationale samtale om den europæiske sikkerhedsorden.

With this special issue of Defence Studies, we situate defence planning as a constitutive element of defence and strategic studies. Indeed, in addition to the usual “downstream” focus on the use or non-use of force, on policy decision-making in foreign relations, military operations and global external engagement, we argue for the utility of an increased “upstream” focus on what is a major part of everyday defence and security policy practice for military, civilian administrative and political leadership: the forward-looking preparations for the armed forces and other capabilities of tomorrow. In particular, the special issue contributions explore two general dimensions of defence planning: the long-term, historical relationship between defence planning and the state including national variations in civil-military relations, and a concurrent tension between defence planning as an administrative, analytically neutral activity and the politics of its organisation and outcomes. In both of these, defence planning appears as a particular case of general planning, as a lens that enables particular foci on the external world to come about on behalf of the state while also sometimes creating institutionalised biases along the way. In this manner, paraphrasing Émile Durkheim, defence planning emerges as a “strategic fact” with dynamics of its own.

Through the contributions of this special issue, defence planning emerges as a strategic fact with a significance of its own. Defence planning does not merely serve as a conduit for external forces, but instead appears as an independent or intermediate variable as well as a discrete arena for national security processing. In this conclusion, we return to the overall issue of defence planning as an object of study as proposed in the introduction. We identify three analytical dimensions inspired by the contributions which offer avenues for future research on defence planning. These are process versus change, the issue of national versus comparative or international dynamics, and finally hybrid or interface dynamics. It is, in other words, important to account for the roles defence planning may play with regard to affecting change in strategic affairs, to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of defence planning in central national cases such as the US as well as the international and comparative aspects of such dynamics, and finally it is important to analyse the characteristics and effects of defence planning in its wider political, administrative and strategic contexts.