Camilla Tenna Nørup Sørensen

This chapter examines the evolving Chinese strategy in the Arctic, focusing especially on whether we see Chinese grey zone tactics aimed at taking advantage of the legal gaps, thresholds and uncertainties in Arctic governance to gradually push for a change in the Arctic governance regime allowing more influence for non-Arctic States such as China. It finds that there are various Chinese efforts to challenge the privileges of the Arctic States in Arctic governance and gradually influence or shape Arctic governance. However, these Chinese efforts have so far been limited, offering little support to warnings about Chinese lawfare activities in the Arctic. There is nonetheless reason to continue to carefully follow the evolving Chinese approach to the Arctic. This is especially the case following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that potentially presents China with new opportunities. A more isolated and weakened Russia increasingly dependent on China is forced to compromise regarding its resistance towards allowing non-Arctic States into the region, including into Arctic governance. Consequently, the Russian bargaining position in relation to China— including in relation to the Arctic—weakens, and with the Arctic Council on pause following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is more room for China to push for non-Arctic specific governance.

The content and focus of China’s Arctic agenda have broadened in the recent decade as Beijing has focussed on establishing itself as a leading power within the domains of knowledge and innovative, new technologies. China has tried to establish its presence and influence in the Arctic, but the Chinese strategic approach of gradually building comprehensive relations with Arctic states and stakeholders—using, for example, offers of research cooperation, infrastructure projects, and trade and investments—has not been successful, which has left Russia as China’s gateway to the Arctic. The Arctic is an area of growing Russian and Chinese cooperation. The Sino-Russian joint statement from February 2022 declares, “The sides agreed to continue consistently intensifying practical cooperation for the sustainable development of the Arctic.”1 This mention of the Arctic is the first of its kind in a Sino-Russian joint statement, and it arguably indicates how a weakened Russia increasingly dependent on China could be willing to compromise on its resistance toward allowing non-Arctic states to play a stronger role in the region. Consequently, the key question is whether China has new strategic opportunities to establish its presence and influence in the Arctic following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Dette kapitel giver en introduktion til konflikten i Taiwanstrædet med fokus på, hvordan det forværrede forhold mellem Kina og USA ændrer de dynamikker, som ellers har sikret stabiliteten over strædet de seneste mange årtier. At det udvikler sig til en militær konflikt i Taiwanstrædet er ikke uundgåeligt, men som dette kapitel vil vise, er der en farlig udvikling i gang. Kina, USA og Taiwan søger alle at udvise beslutsomhed i håb om at afskrække og afværge yderligere forværringer, men resultatet er forstærket mistilliden og en øget risikoen for misforståelser og overreaktioner samt uheld og sammenstød som følge af den stigende militær tilstedeværelse fra alle tre sider på et relativ afgrænset geografisk område. Konflikten i Taiwanstrædet skal ikke løses, men den skal håndteres. Det kræver imidlertid vilje, kreativ diplomati og politisk kompromisvillighed i såvel Beijing og Washington som Taipei, og det er der knaphed på.

Kina står i disse år ved en korsvej – hvilken vej går Xi Jinping og Kommunistpartiet? Der er i disse år mange modsatrettede tendenser og drivkræfter. Den videre udvikling i Kina-USA-forholdet kommer til at spille en afgørende rolle med Taiwan som den mest sprængfarlige strid. Det bliver imidlertid også vigtigt, hvordan EU og de europæiske lande søger at manøvrere i forhold til Kina-USA-stormagtskonfrontationen...[..]...Der er udfordringer nok at håndtere inden for landets egne grænser. Relationen mellem Kommunistpartiet og det kinesiske samfund er under pres og undergår store forandringer. De kommende år får uden tvivl afgørende betydning for den fremtidige udvikling – både indenrigspolitisk i Kina, og hvad angår Kinas rolle og indflydelse i det internationale system. Der er meget på spil. Det gør det endnu vigtigere at forstå Kinas udgangspunkt og udvikling samt de kinesiske opfattelser og analyser.

Starting from a neorealist emphasis on structural constraints and incenives, this chapter explores the complex links between the US unipolar world order and China’s Rise and discusses how US-China relations are likely to develop in a post-US unipolar world order. The key aim is demonstrating how the “assertive turn” in Chinese foreign and security policy and the intensifying US-China great power rivalry are unavoidable consequences of weakening US unipolarity.